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Abstract
Firms have increasingly conducted di¤erent stages of production in
di¤erent countries. In particular, they may set up operations in low-
cost countries (those operations are referred to as foreign a¢ liates in
those countries) either as platforms for export or serving the growing
markets there. What is the exporting behavior of foreign a¢ liates? In
this paper, using data from China, we nd that among foreign a¢ li-
ates exporters are less productive than non-exporters. We then o¤er
a theoretical explanation by incorporating into the standard rm het-
erogeneity model the possibility that rms could have di¤erent stages
of production in di¤erent countries.
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1 Introduction
Since mid-1990s, there has been increasing evidence suggesting that export-
ing behavior varies signicantly across rms even after controlling for indus-
try e¤ects (see, for example, Bernard and Jensen, 1995, 1999). A unanimous
nding in the literature is that exporters are more productive than non-
exporters (called export premium), e.g., Bernard and Jensen (1995, 1999,
2004) for the study of the United States; Bernard and Wagner (1997) for
the study of Germany; Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998) for the study of
Columbia, Mexico and Morocco; and Greenaway and Kneller (2004) for the
study of the United Kingdom. A dominant theoretical explanation for the
export premium result is based on the existence of xed costs of export-
ing, under which more productive rms self-select to become exporters (e.g.,
Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum, 2003; Melitz, 2003; and Bernard, Red-
ding, and Schott, 2007).1
However, almost all the existing studies implicitly focus on the exporting
behavior of domestic rms, or at least they do not explicitly di¤erentiate do-
mestic rms from foreign a¢ liates (foreign-invested rms operating in those
countries).2 As transport and communications costs decrease, rms have
increasingly conducted di¤erent stages of production in di¤erent countries.
In particular, rms may set up their production plants in low-cost countries
such as Brazil, China, India, and Russia as their export platforms, which
is referred to as vertical foreign direct investment (or FDI) in the literature
(e.g., Hummels, Ishii, and Yi, 2001; Yeaple, 2003; Yi, 2003; Grossman, Help-
man, and Szeidl, 2006; Ekholm, Forslid, and Markusen, 2007).3 As a result, a
signicant percentage of export from those low-cost countries is made by for-
eign a¢ liates in the countries. Is the exporting behavior of foreign a¢ liates
similar to that of domestic rms? In this paper, we ll the void by investi-
gating empirically the exporting behavior of foreign a¢ liates using data from
China, and then o¤er a theoretical explanation for the empirical ndings.4
1Some recent studies, however, show that there also exists learning from exporting
(e.g., Blalock and Gertler, 2004; Van Biesebroeck, 2005; De Loecker, 2007).
2Baldwin and Gu (2003) and Kneller and Pisu (2004) are two exceptions, using data
from Canada and UK respectively, but neither has found any signicant di¤erence between
domestic rms and foreign a¢ liates. Presumably, the sample sizes of foreign a¢ liates in
these two countries are not large enough.
3It should be pointed out that foreign multinationals may also have direct investment
in those countries to serve the growing markets there, and such investment is referred to
as horizontal FDI in the literature (Markusen, 2002).
4Here exporting behavior refers to how foreign a¢ liates with di¤erent productivity
choose to set up di¤erent stages of production in di¤erent countries and the associated
export status.
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China o¤ers an ideal setting to investigate this issue. Between 1979 and
2005, China has attracted more than US$1,285 billion FDI (China Statistical
Yearbook, 2006). Meanwhile, China was the second largest exporter in the
world in 2007 (The World Factbook, 2007). More importantly, much of
Chinas export has been made by foreign a¢ liates, not Chinas domestic
rms (Manova and Zhang, 2008).
Our dataset comes from annual surveys of manufacturing rms conducted
by the National Bureau of Statistics of China for the period of 1998 to 2005.
We nd that among Chinas domestic rms, exporters are indeed more pro-
ductive than non-exporters, similar to the unanimous nding in the existing
literature. Surprisingly, for foreign a¢ liates in China, exporters are found
to be less productive. Moreover, we nd that, among foreign a¢ liates, those
selling all their output in China have the highest productivity, followed by
those having sales in China and also exporting some of their output, and
nally those exporting all their output. These ndings remain robust to a
number of sensitivity checks, such as an alternative measure of productivity,
an alternative estimation method, an alternative denition of foreign a¢ li-
ates, exclusion of outlying observations, inclusion of rm size as an additional
control variable, and estimation of productivity separately for domestic rms
and foreign a¢ liates.
We next construct a simple model to explain the exporting behavior of
foreign a¢ liates. It is a standard 2 2 2 trade model à la Grossman, Help-
man, and Szeidl (2006), with two sectors (i.e., homogenous good sector and
di¤erentiated goods sector), two factors (i.e., skilled labor and unskilled la-
bor), and two countries (i.e., China and the United States). Similar to Melitz
(2003)s setting, rms di¤er in their productivity, which is drawn from a com-
mon distribution. There are two vertically-related stages of the production
process, i.e., design and manufacturing. The United States has a cost advan-
tage in design whereas China has a cost advantage in manufacturing. For
simplicity, we assume there is a negligible transport cost for shipping the de-
sign product to the manufacturing plant, thereby the design stage is always
located in the United States. But the transport cost for shipping the nal
product to an abroad market is non-trivial, thereby rms can choose to set
up their manufacturing plant in either the United States, or China, or both.
Firms can also choose to sell their output in the United States, or China,
or both. There is a xed cost for setting up a manufacturing plant in any
of these two countries, and also a xed cost of selling in any of these two
markets.
Under this framework, there are nine possible strategies in organization
choice and market orientation, i.e., manufacturing plant in either the United
States, or China, or both, and selling in either the United States, or China, or
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both. We can show that in equilibrium there are four strategies correspond-
ing to the three types of foreign a¢ liates observed in our dataset: foreign
a¢ liates selling all their output in China, those exporting all their output,
and those having sales in China and exporting some of their output. The
comparison among these four strategies in terms of their productivity o¤ers
an explanation for the puzzling exporting behavior of foreign a¢ liates (i.e.,
exporters have lower productivity than non-exporters among foreign a¢ li-
ates).5 Intuitively, the choice among the di¤erent strategies depends on the
trade-o¤ between xed costs and production e¢ ciency (determined by the
size of the markets and the unit cost of production). Compare, for example,
the strategy of exporting all their output with the strategy of having sales
in China and exporting some of their output. The latter strategy gains an
extra market (i.e., the market in China) but needs to incur a xed cost of
selling in China. Clearly the more productive foreign a¢ liates choose the
latter strategy given the trade-o¤ between xed costs and market size.
Our paper builds upon a large literature of rm heterogeneity and trade.
What di¤erentiates our paper from the literature is its focus on the export-
ing behavior of foreign a¢ liates, which are increasingly prevalent in todays
global economy. We show that the relation between productivity and ex-
porting behavior for foreign a¢ liates is just the opposite of the unanimous
nding in the literature which focuses on domestic rms. Theoretically, by
incorporating into the standard rm heterogeneity model (Melitz, 2003) the
possibility that rms could set up di¤erent stages of production in di¤erent
countries à la Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006), we are able to ob-
tain richer predictions on the relation between productivity and exporting
behavior.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes
data, and Section 3 presents our empirical ndings. In Section 4, we o¤er
a theoretical model to explain our empirical ndings. The paper concludes
with Section 5.
2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our data is from annual surveys of manufacturing rms conducted by the
National Bureau of Statistics of China for the period of 1998 to 2005. These
annual surveys covered all state-owned enterprises, and those non-state-
owned enterprises with annual sales of ve million Chinese currency (about
5Our framework can also show that, for domestic rms in China, it is the more pro-
ductive ones that export, which is consistent with our empirical ndings and in line with
the predictions of other theoretical models in the literature.
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US$650,000) or more. The data provides detailed information on rmsiden-
tication, operations and performance, including rm ownership and export,
which are of special interest to this study. As reported in Table 1a, the
number of manufacturing rms with valid information of total output and
export varies from over 140,000 in the late 1990s to over 243,000 in 2005.
The percentage of Chinas total exports contributed by rms in our dataset
was just below 70% in late 1990s, and was as high as 76% in 2005, indicating
that our data set is highly comprehensive.
The focus of this study is on the exporting behavior of foreign a¢ liates.
According to the classication of the National Bureau of Statistics of China,
foreign a¢ liates are rms in which 25% or more equity shares are held by
foreign multinationals.6 We use this denition of foreign a¢ liates in most
of our analysis. As a robustness check, we also use rms ownership type
reported in the dataset to dene foreign a¢ liates. Specically, there are ve
types of ownership: state-owned rms, collectively-owned rms, joint-stock
companies, privately-owned rms, and foreign-invested rms. We treat rms
with foreign-invested ownership type as foreign a¢ liates.
As shown in Table 1b, over the period of 1998 to 2005, an average of
27.14% of Chinas manufacturing rms (including both domestic rms and
foreign a¢ liates) exported. Foreign a¢ liates are much more export-oriented
than do domestic rms: 62.95% of foreign a¢ liates are exporters whereas the
corresponding number for domestic rms is 18.68%. The di¤erence between
these two types of rms in export intensity is even greater: the percentage of
export in total output hovered around 10.48% for Chinas domestic rms over
the sample period, whereas that for foreign a¢ liates increased from 39.23%
in 1998 to 44.60% in 2005.7 Taken together, the percentage of Chinas total
export by foreign a¢ liates increased from 59.66% in 1998 to 70.98% in 2005,
showing that foreign a¢ liates are the main driver behind the spectacular rise
of Chinas export.
Exporting behavior of Chinas manufacturing rms varies signicantly
across its geographic areas.8 As shown in Table 1c, foreign a¢ liates located
6Our main results remain robust if rms from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan are
excluded from the sample.
7From the 2002 U.S. census of manufacturers, it is found that 20% of U.S. manufac-
turing plants exported and the exporters shipped 15% of their output abroad (Bernard,
Jensen, Redding, and Schott, 2007). The percentage of exporters in the French manufac-
turing industries is also 20%, though the export intensity is lower at 10% (Eaton, Kortum
and Kramarz, 2004).
8During the sample period, Chinas administrative boundaries and consequently its
county, city, or even provincial codes experienced some changes. For example, new counties
were established, while existing counties were combined into larger ones or even elevated to
cities. From 1998 to 2005, the number of counties in China increased from 2,496 to 2,862 (a
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in Chinas coastal area have higher propensities to export and higher export
intensities than those located in Chinas central area, which in turn have
higher propensities to export and higher export intensities than those lo-
cated in Chinas western area. Presumably, foreign a¢ liates located in the
central and western areas focus more on Chinas domestic markets than their
counterparts located in the coastal area. Meanwhile, Chinas domestic rms
have lower propensities to export and lower export intensities than foreign
a¢ liates in each of the three areas. There is little di¤erence in the propen-
sity to export between domestic rms located in the coastal area and those
in the central area, though the former have much higher export intensity
than the latter. Overall, 93.8% percent of Chinas total exports are made by
rms located in the coastal area, and 71.4% of these exports are from foreign
a¢ liates in this area.
Besides the di¤erences across geographic areas, there are also signicant
variations in exporting behavior across industries.9 As the technology content
of Chinas exports has become an interesting topic, we look at the patterns
of exporting behavior across the low-tech, medium-tech, and high-tech in-
dustries classied according to the OECD standard. Several patterns emerge
from the results summarized in Table 1d: (1) 51.8% of Chinas export is
from the high-tech industries, followed by 32.0% in the low-tech industries
and 16.2% in the medium-tech industries. Given Chinas comparative ad-
vantage in low-tech industries, it seems puzzling that China exports large
amounts of high-tech goods as well as low-tech goods (Rodrik, 2006; Wang
and Wei, 2008; Lu and Xu, 2009). (2) In the high-tech industries and low-
tech industries, compared with the national averages, both foreign a¢ liates
and domestic rms have higher propensities to export and higher export in-
tensities, accounting for the high export in these two types of industries.
total of 366), while the number of changes in the county codes was 648. From 1998 to 2005,
the number of prefecture-level cities or above increased from 231 (4 municipalities, 15 vice
provincial cities, and 212 prefecture-level cities) to 287 (4 municipalities, 15 vice provincial
cities, and 268 prefecture-level cities). Using the 1999 National Standard (promulgated
at the end of 1998 and called GB/T 2260-1999) as the benchmark codes, we convert the
regional codes of all the rms to these benchmark codes to achieve consistency for the
regional codes in the whole sample period.
9In 2003, a new classication system for industry codes (called GB/T 4754-2002) was
adopted to replace the old classication system (called GB/T 4754-1994) that had been
used from 1995 to 2002. To achieve consistency in the industry codes for the whole
sample period (1998-2005), we convert the industry codes in the 2003-2005 data to the
old classication system by using a concordance table (in the case of a new four-digit
code corresponding to an old four-digit code or several new four-digit codes corresponding
to an old four-digit code) or by assigning a new code for an old code based on product
information (in the case of several old four-digit codes corresponding to a new 4-digit
code).
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(3) Foreign a¢ liates are responsible for 82.8% percentage of export in the
high-tech industries, indicating that much of the worry about the increasing
competitiveness of Chinas exports in the high-tech industries might well be
misguided as export in the high-tech industries are made by foreign a¢ liates
rather than Chinas domestic rms.
Table 1e provides further descriptive statistics regarding the exporting
behavior of foreign a¢ liates, which is the focus of this paper. Over the
period of 1998-2005, on average, 37.05% of foreign a¢ liates sell all their
output in China, 39.22% of foreign a¢ liates have sales in China and also
export some of their output, and 23.73% of foreign a¢ liates export all their
output. Meanwhile, during this period, the percentage of foreign a¢ liates
having both sales in China and export increases at the expenses of foreign
a¢ liates selling all their output in China and those exporting all their output.
3 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we empirically investigate the exporting behavior of foreign
a¢ liates in China. The key performance indicator used in the literature to
document the possible di¤erence between exporters and non-exporters is the
total factor productivity (TFP), e.g., Bernard and Jensen (1995, 1999, 2004),
Bernard and Wagner (1997), Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998), Greenaway
and Kneller (2004), and De Loecker (2007). Specically, we estimate the
following equation:
TFPfirt = +   Exportfirt + i + r + t + "firt (1)
where TFPfirt is the TFP of rm f in industry i, region r and year t;
Exportfirt is a dummy variable indicating whether rm f is an exporter;
i, r and t are 4-digit industry dummy, region dummy,
10 and year dummy,
respectively; and "firt is the error term.
Four variables are used to estimate TFP: output, labor, capital, and
intermediate inputs. After deleting observations with missing information
related to these four variables, we obtain a balanced sample of 31,057 rms
that appeared in the dataset for all eight years from 1998 to 2005. An
additional 51 rms are deleted because of missing information about export.
As the focus of our study is on the exporting behavior of foreign a¢ liates, we
further exclude rms that switched, one time or more, from foreign a¢ liates
to domestic rms, or vice versa. Specically, a total of 3,158 rms are deleted
10Region here refers to 22 provinces, 4 province-level municipalities, and 5 minority
autonomous regions in China.
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when foreign a¢ liates are dened as rms with 25% or more equity shares
held by foreign multinationals, whereas a total of 1,104 rms are deleted
when foreign a¢ liates are dened by their reported ownership type.
We rst use the ordinary-least-squares (OLS) regression method to es-
timate the TFP for rms in each 2-digit industry and each year (denoted
by TFP OLS) (see also Bernard and Jensen, 1999). Specically, we use
the constant value of output, and deate capital by the xed-assets invest-
ment price index and intermediate inputs by the producer price index. The
OLS estimation of TFP, however, may su¤er from the simultaneity problem,
specically, input choices could be endogenously determined by unobserv-
able productivity shocks. This may lead to an upward bias in the estimation
coe¢ cients of more variable inputs such as labor (Van Biesebroeck, 2007,
2008).
We therefore use an alternative estimation method, i.e., Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003)s TFP estimation method (denoted by TFP LP ), in which
the intermediate inputs are used as a proxy for unobservable productivity
shocks to deal with the simultaneity problem.11 As Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003)s TFP estimation method relies on the panel estimation of rms that
remain in the same industries throughout the estimation period, we therefore
delete those rms that experienced changes in their 2-digit industry a¢ lia-
tions during the sample period. We end up with a reduced sample of 22,549
rms. The average coe¢ cients for labor, capital and intermediate inputs are
0.055, 0.032 and 0.743 respectively (the estimated coe¢ cients of inputs for
each 2-digit industry are available online). For comparison, we also use the
OLS method to estimate TFP for this reduced sample in each 2-digit indus-
try and each year (denoted by TFP OLSR) (results are available online).
The average coe¢ cients for labor, capital and intermediate inputs under the
OLS estimation are 0.062, 0.036 and 0.891 respectively. Consistent with the
ndings in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and Van Biesebroeck (2008), the
coe¢ cient for labor is over-estimated under the OLS method.
Moreover, as a further robustness check, we re-estimate the TFP at more
disaggregated industry level. Specically, we use the OLS method to estimate
the TFP in each 3-digit industry and each year (denoted by TFP OLS3D),
and the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)s method in each 3-digit industry (de-
noted by TFP LP 3D).12
11An alternative method for dealing with the endogeneity problem is Olley and Pakes
method (1996), which uses investment as a proxy for unobservable productivity shocks.
However, there is a large number of missing information on investment in our dataset
(i.e, only 5,943 rms out of 27,848 have positive investment). Therefore Olley and Pakes
method is not econometrically e¢ cient in our case.
12In the OLS estimation, as some industry-year cells have very few observations, we
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Benchmark regression results for equation (1) are reported in Table 2. As
shown in Column 1, when all rms are included in the regression analysis,
Exportfirt has a positive and statistically signicant e¤ect on TFP estimated
using the OLS method, which is similar to the ndings reported in the lit-
erature. Next, we carry out the analysis for the two sub-samples, one for
domestic rms and the other for foreign a¢ liates, and report the results
in Columns 2-3 of Table 2, respectively. Surprisingly, we nd contrasting
patterns of exporting behavior between domestic rms and foreign a¢ liates.
The estimated coe¢ cient of Exportfirt for foreign a¢ liates becomes negative
and statistically signicant, though that for domestic rms remains positive
and statistically signicant. The negative coe¢ cient of Exportfirt for foreign
a¢ liates remains robust when the TFP is estimated using Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003)s method (Column 4 of Table 2); when the TFP is estimated
using the OLS method for the same reduced sample as used in the Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003)s estimation (Column 5 of Table 2); and when the TFP is
estimated using the OLS and the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)s method at
the 3-digit industry level (Columns 6-7 of Table 2).
As there are three types of foreign a¢ liates (i.e., foreign a¢ liates with
domestic sales only, those with both domestic sales and export, and those
with export only), we therefore replace the export dummy of equation (1)
by two dummy variables: one for foreign a¢ liates with domestic sales only
(denoted by Domestic Sales Onlyfirt), and the other for foreign a¢ liates
with export only (denoted by Export Onlyfirt). As shown in Columns 8-12
of Table 2, the coe¢ cients for Domestic Sales Onlyfirt are positive albeit
statistically insignicant when the TFP is estimated using the OLS method,
but they are both positive and statistically signicant when the TFP is es-
timated using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)s method. Meanwhile, the
coe¢ cients for Export Onlyfirt are always negative and statistically signi-
cant. These results o¤er a ner ranking of foreign a¢ liates in terms of their
productivity. Specically, foreign a¢ liates with domestic sales only have the
highest productivity, followed by those with both domestic sales and export,
and nally those with export only.13
Note that our analysis thus far is based on the balanced sample of rms for
the period of 1998-2005. As China continues its rapid economic growth, there
exclude those cells with observations below 10 to reduce possible estimation biases. In
the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)s estimation, we exclude those rms that changed their
3-digit industry a¢ liations during the sample period.
13The ranking of the average TFP (estimated using Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)s
method) among these three types of foreign a¢ liates in each of the twenty-eight two-digit
manufacturing industries is in general consistent with our regression results (available
online).
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has been a surge of foreign direct investment aiming at capturing the Chinese
market in more recent years. Thus it would be interesting to investigate
if newly established foreign a¢ liates behave di¤erently from those in the
balanced sample. We then use the full sample of rms in 2005, and report
the regression results in Table 3. It is found that the coe¢ cient of dummy
variable Export Onlyfirt remains negative albeit statistically insignicant
(Column 1 of Table 3), generally consistent with our results in Table 2. In
Column 2, we replace the dummy variable Export Onlyfirt by two other
dummy variables (Domestic Sales Onlyfirt, and Export Onlyfirt), and nd
that the coe¢ cients of these two dummy variables are both negative and
statistically signicant. These results imply that foreign a¢ liates exporting
all their output are less productive than those having both sales in China
and exporting some of their output (consistent with our results in Table 2),
but that foreign a¢ liates selling all output in China become less productive
than those having both sales in China and exporting some of their output
(in contrast with those in Table 2). As our theoretical analysis will show,
there are two types of foreign a¢ liates selling all their output in China, one
focuses exclusively on the Chinese market and the other has presence in both
Chinese and world markets. The contrasting nding between Table 2 and
Table 3 can be explained as that foreign a¢ liates entering into China after
1998 may predominantly focus exclusively on the growing market in China,
thereby overshadowing those older foreign a¢ liates having presence in both
the Chinese and world markets.
In the remaining part of this section, we conduct a series of robustness
checks regarding the relation between rm productivity and exporting behav-
ior for foreign a¢ liates. To save space, we only report the results using the
TFP estimated by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)s method as the dependent
variable and using the balanced sample for the period 1998-2005.
First, we use an alternative denition of foreign a¢ liates  the o¢ cial
ownership type reported by the rm in the survey instead of that implied
by foreign equity ownership. As shown in Column 1 of Table 4, our main
results remain robust to this denition of foreign a¢ liates.
Second, to address the concern that our results could be driven by some
outlying observations, we exclude the top and bottom 1% observations in our
sample and repeat the analysis. As shown in Column 2 of Table 4, our main
results remain robust to the exclusion of outlying observations.
Third, to make sure that our results are not entirely driven by rm size, we
incorporate Firm Size (dened as the logarithm of capital) in the regression
analysis. The result reported in Column 3 of Table 4 reveal that our ndings
remain robust to the inclusion of Firm Size.
Lastly, to deal with the concern that foreign a¢ liates may have di¤erent
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production functions from domestic rms, we re-estimate the TFP of foreign
a¢ liates using only the sub-sample of foreign a¢ liates. As shown in Column
4 of Table 4, our main ndings remain robust to this alternative estimation
of TFP.
Taken together, the empirical analysis in this section shows that for for-
eign a¢ liates, those exporting all their output are less productive than those
having both sales in China and also exporting some of their output, which
in turn are generally less productive than those selling all their output in
China. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst study reporting that
exporters are less productive than non-exporters in the literature. Our study
is also one of the few studies on the exporting behavior of foreign a¢ liates.
4 Theoretical Analysis
In this section, we build a simple model based on Grossman, Helpman, and
Szeidl (2006) to explain our empirical ndings regarding the exporting be-
havior of foreign a¢ liates documented in the previous section.
4.1 Model Setup
It is a standard 2  2  2 trade model, in which there are two countries
(i.e., China (C) and the United States (A)), two sectors (i.e., a homogeneous
good (X) produced with a constant return to scale technology and a contin-
uum of di¤erentiated goods (Y ) produced with an increasing return to scale
technology), and two factors (i.e., skilled labor and unskilled labor).
Following the literature (i.e., Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977), we take the ho-
mogeneous good (X) as a numéraire and assume the utility function for the
di¤erentiated goods (Y ) to be a constant elasticity of substitution function.
Then the demand function for any di¤erentiated good in country l can be
derived as:
yl = 
 
1  I l(pl)
 1
1  ; 0 <  < 1 (2)
where l 2 fA;Cg is the index for the country; yl is the consumption of the
di¤erentiated good in country l; I l is the aggregate demand level (or market
size) in country l; and pl is the price of the di¤erentiated good in country l.
There are two vertically-related stages for producing any variety of the
di¤erentiated goods, i.e., design (d) and manufacturing (m). It is assumed
that the design stage is more intensive in the usage of skilled labor than does
the manufacturing stage, and that the United States has a lower wage of
skilled labor but a higher wage of unskilled labor than does China. Thus
11
the United States has a cost-advantage in design while China has a cost-
advantage in manufacturing, i.e., the design cost in the United States (dA)
is lower than that in China (dC), but the manufacturing cost in the United
States (mA) in higher than that in China (mC). The unit cost for producing
the nal product is then given by c(dl;ml)=, where the rst term of c(:; :)
indicating the design cost and the second term indicating the manufacturing
cost, and  is the rm-specic productivity measure, which is drawn from a
common distribution as in Melitz (2003).
There is a xed cost associated with setting up a plant of design or man-
ufacturing in any of the two countries. We assume that the xed cost uses
the same intensity of skilled labor and unskilled labor as the unit produc-
tion cost (for the use of same assumption, see for example Baldwin, Forslid,
Martin, Ottaviano, and Robert-Nicoud, 2003; Bernard, Redding, and Schott,
2007). Thus the xed cost of setting up a design plant in the United States
(fAd ) is lower than that in China (f
C
d ) whereas the xed cost of setting up a
manufacturing plant in the United States (fAm) in higher than that in China
(fCm).
There is also a xed cost involved with the sales of the nal product, e.g.,
the costs of setting up a distribution network. To take into account of the
possible heterogeneity in selling costs, we assume that the xed cost of selling
the di¤erentiated good in any of the two countries is fs if the manufacturing
of the nal product takes place in the same country, but is increased to
fs +fs if the manufacturing takes place in a di¤erent country.
It is assumed that the transport cost for the design product is negligible
(e.g., the design product could be transmitted by E-mail or sent by express
mail), but there is a non-zero transport cost for shipping the nal product
to an abroad market. Specically, the transport cost takes the form of an
iceberg cost, i.e., one needs t > 1 units of nal product in order to ship 1
unit to an abroad market. It is further assumed that the transport cost for
the nal product is non-trivial, i.e., for the market in the United States, the
unit cost for the nal product is higher when the nal product is imported
from China than when it is produced in the United States (called the tari¤-
jumping assumption). Without this assumption, manufacturing is always
conducted in China, which makes the analysis less interesting.14
A rm needs to make two decisions, one is where to set up its design
and manufacturing plants and the other is where to sell its nal product.
As there is a negligible transport cost for the design product and the United
14More generally, if this assumption is not satised, production processes are completely
disintegrated with each production stage located in the country with the comparative
advantage.
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States has cost-advantages in both the xed cost and the unit production
cost for the design stage, the design plant is always located in the United
States.15 However, for the manufacturing plant, it could be located in the
United States only (A), China only (C), or both the United States and China
(AC). Meanwhile, a rm can sell its nal product in the United States only
(A), China only (C), or both the United States and China (AC).
Let (:; :; :) denote a strategy for the rm, where the rst entry represents
the location of the design plant, the second entry represents the location of
the manufacturing plant, and the last entry represents the location of the nal
product market. There are altogether nine possible strategies: (A;A;A),
(A;A;C), (A;A;AC), (A;C;A), (A;C;C), (A;C;AC), (A;AC;A),
(A;AC;C), and (A;AC;AC).
4.2 Equilibrium Strategy
Given the above setup, we can derive the equilibrium prot function for each
possible strategy (()). In analyzing the optimal strategy, we adopt the
iterated elimination method, i.e., once a possible strategy is dominated by
another, it is eliminated from the choice.
Step 1: (A;A;C), (A;AC;A), and (A;AC;C) are dominated strate-
gies.
(A;A;C) (design and manufacturing in the United States, and selling
in China) is dominated by (A;C;C) (design in the United States, and man-
ufacturing and selling in China), because the latter enjoys a lower manu-
facturing cost and does not need to incur any transport cost for the nal
product.
(A;AC;A) (design in the United States, manufacturing in both the
United States and China, and selling in the United States) is dominated by
either (A;A;A) (design, manufacturing and selling in the United States).
Because of the tari¤-jumping assumption, the market in the United States is
only served by the manufacturing plant in the United States. As a result, the
former strategy incurs a redundant xed cost of setting up a manufacturing
plant in China.
(A;AC;C) (design in the United States, manufacturing in both the
United States and China, and selling in China) is dominated by (A;C;C)
(design in the United States, and manufacturing and selling in China). In
this case, the market in China is only served by the manufacturing plant
15It is commonly assumed in the literature that the design stage is always located in
the United States and rms only decide where to set up their manufacturing plants, e.g.,
Antras (2003), Antras and Helpman (2004), and Helpman and Grossman (2005).
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in China due to the lower manufacturing cost in China and the saving of
transport costs. As a result, the former strategy incurs a redundant xed
cost of setting up a manufacturing plant in the United States.
Step 2: (A;A;A) and (A;A;AC) are not observed in our dataset.
Both (A;A;A) (design, manufacturing and selling in the United States)
and (A;A;AC) (design and manufacturing in the United States, and selling
in both the United States and China) represent the American domestic rms
as all their production takes place in the United States. In the rst case, the
rm sells all its output in the United States, and in the second case the rm
exports some of its output to China (to China it is import). Thus, these two
cases are not foreign a¢ liates in China and not observed in our dataset.
Step 3: the comparison among (A;C;C), (A;C;A), (A;C;AC), and
(A;AC;AC).
Now we are left with only four possible strategies: (A;C;C) represents
the strategy with design in the United States, manufacturing in China, and
selling in China; (A;C;A) represents the strategy with design in the United
States, manufacturing in China, and selling in the United States; (A;C;AC)
is the strategy with design in the United States, manufacturing in China,
and selling in both the United States and China; and (A;AC;AC) is the
strategy with design in the United States, manufacturing and selling in both
the United States and China (and due to the tari¤-jumping assumption, the
manufacturing plant in the United States serves only the market there while
the manufacturing plant in China serves only the Chinese market).
The prot functions for foreign a¢ liates adopting these four strategies
can be shown as follows:8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
((A;C;C)) = (1 )I
C
C(dA;mC)
  (fAd + fCm + fs)
((A;C;A)) =
(1 ) IA
T
C(dA;mC)
  (fAd + fCm + fs +fs)
((A;C;AC)) =
(1 )

IC+ I
A
T

C(dA;mC)
  (fAd + fCm + 2fs +fs)
((A;AC;AC)) =

(1 )IC
C(dA;mC)
+ (1 )I
A
C(dA;mA)

  (fAd + fAm + fCm + 2fs)
;
(3)
where    1  is a monotonic transform of productivity ; C(:; :) 
c (:; :)

1  is a monotonic transform of unit production cost c (:; :); T  t 1 
is a monotonic transform of transport cost t; and I l is the market size in
country l, l 2 fA;Cg.
It is clear that the prot function for each of these four strategies is a
linear function of , and it just di¤ers in the slope term (denoted by ) and
the intercept term (the negative of the xed costs, denoted by F ) across the
di¤erent strategies (see the Figure for illustration).
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The comparison of the xed costs across the four strategies is straight-
forward. Specically, as strategy (A;C;C) has design in the United States
and manufacturing in China to serve the market in China, the xed costs are
equal to F(A;C;C)  fAd + fCm + fs. Strategy (A;C;A) involves design in the
United States but manufacturing in China to serve the market in the United
States, and so the xed costs increase to F(A;C;A)  fAd + fCm + fs+fs due
to the extra selling costs involved when the market is served by manufac-
turing plant located in a di¤erent country. Strategy (A;C;AC) has design
in the United States and manufacturing in China to serve both the market
in China and the market in the United States, and its xed costs increase
further to F(A;C;AC)  fAd +fCm+2fs+fs due to the additional selling cost
in China. Finally, strategy (A;AC;AC) has design in the United States,
and manufacturing plants in both the United States and China to serve the
respective markets, and thus, compared with strategy (A;C;AC), there is
an increase in the manufacturing costs in the United States but a decrease in
the selling costs in the United States (i.e., F(A;AC;AC)  fAd +fAm+fCm+2fs).
It is expected that F(A;AC;AC) is higher than F(A;C;AC) as the additional
manufacturing costs (fAm) are generally greater than the additional selling
costs (fs). So we have the following ranking of the xed costs for these
four strategies:
F(A;C;C) < F(A;C;A) < F(A;C;AC) < F(A;AC;AC): (4)
The slope term () is determined by the unit cost of production (the
denominator, C(:; :)) and the size of the markets (the nominator, I l, adjusted
by relevant transport cost T ). For strategies (A;C;C), (A;C;A) and
(A;C;AC), they have the same unit cost of production, but di¤er in the size
of the market. Assuming that the United States market is su¢ ciently larger
than the China market (i.e., I
A
T
> IC), then the slope increases as one moves
from (A;C;C) to (A;C;A), and to (A;C;AC). Strategy (A;AC;AC)
has the same size of the markets as strategy (A;C;AC), but enjoys a lower
unit production cost than strategy (A;C;AC) due to the tari¤-jumping
assumption. So we have the following ranking of the slope term for these
four strategies:
(A;C;C) < (A;C;A) < (A;C;AC) < (A;AC;AC): (5)
With inequalities (4) and (5), it follows that the optimal strategy for a
foreign a¢ liate depends on its productivity:
Proposition: Given that neither the American market nor the Chinese
market is negligible, foreign a¢ liates adopting strategy (A;AC;AC) have
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the highest productivity, followed by those adopting strategy (A;C;AC),
then those adopting strategy (A;C;A), and nally those adopting strategy
(A;C;C).
Proof: See the Appendix.
In our dataset, foreign a¢ liates exporting all their output corresponds
to those adopting strategy (A;C;A), foreign a¢ liates having sales in China
and also exporting some of their output correspond to those adopting strategy
(A;C;AC), and nally foreign a¢ liates selling all their output in China
could be those adopting either strategy (A;C;C) or strategy (A;AC;AC).
The Proposition predicts that foreign a¢ liates exporting all their output have
lower productivity than those having sales in China and also exporting some
of their output, which is consistent with our empirical ndings reported in
Section 3.
Theoretically, however, it is not clear whether foreign a¢ liates selling all
their output in China have higher productivity than the other two types
of foreign a¢ liates, as foreign a¢ liates selling all their output in China
could be the most productive foreign a¢ liates (i.e., those adopting strategy
(A;AC;AC)) or the least productive foreign a¢ liates (i.e., those adopting
strategy (A;C;C)). Empirically, using the balanced sample for the period
of 1998-2005, we nd that foreign a¢ liates selling all their output in China
have the highest productivity among the three types of foreign a¢ liates, sug-
gesting that foreign a¢ liates adopting strategy (A;AC;AC) dominate those
adopting strategy (A;C;C) in our dataset. But in the full sample of rms
in 2005, we nd that foreign a¢ liates selling all output in China become less
productive than those having both sales in China and exporting some of their
output. This implies that those foreign a¢ liates entering into China after
1998 may predominantly adopt strategy (A;C;C) in view of the growing
market in China, thereby overshadowing those older foreign a¢ liates using
strategy (A;AC;AC).16
Our theoretical analysis expands the existing literature on exporting be-
havior (e.g., Melitz, 2003) by incorporating the possibility that rms could set
up di¤erent stages of production in di¤erent countries (à la Grossman, Help-
man, and Szeidl, 2006), which is increasingly prevalent in todays globalized
economy. The theoretical predictions summarized in the Proposition focus
on the exporting behavior of foreign a¢ liates (namely, those multinationals
that have the manufacturing plants in China), and they are di¤erent from
16Future research will be directed at obtaining ner data sets distinguishing foreign
a¢ liates adopting strategy (A;AC;AC) from those adopting strategy (A;C;C), and
conducting more detailed analysis.
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the ndings reported in the literature. It should be pointed out, however,
that our theoretical framework can generate the same type of predictions
on exporting behavior as in the existing literature if it is focused on domes-
tic rms (namely, rms having both design and manufacturing in China).
Among this type of rms, it is the less productive ones that have domes-
tic sales only while the more productive ones have both domestic sales and
export.
5 Conclusion
Firms have increasingly conducted di¤erent stages of production in di¤erent
countries (e.g., Hummels, Ishii, and Yi, 2001; Yi, 2003). In particular, they
have set up operations in low-cost countries for labor-intensive production,
and then used them as export platforms. As a result, a signicant percentage
of export from those low-cost countries is made by foreign a¢ liates in these
countries. Despite its importance, however, much of the existing literature
has not formally examined the exporting behavior of foreign a¢ liates.
In this paper, we ll the void by empirically and theoretically investigating
the exporting behavior of foreign a¢ liates. Using annual surveys of manu-
facturing rms in China for the period of 1998 to 2005, we nd that among
foreign a¢ liates in China exporters are less productive than non-exporters,
in contrast to the unanimous nding in the literature that exporters are more
productive than non-exporters.
To explain this puzzling nding, we build up a standard trade model,
with rm heterogeneity and location choices of vertically-related stages of
production (e.g., Melitz, 2003; Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl, 2006). We
can show that in equilibrium there are four strategies corresponding to the
three types of foreign a¢ liates observed in our dataset: foreign a¢ liates sell-
ing all their output in China, foreign a¢ liates exporting all their output, and
foreign a¢ liates having sales in China and exporting some of their output.
The comparison among these four strategies in terms of their productivity
o¤ers an explanation for our empirical nding that among foreign a¢ liates
exporters are less productive than non-exporters.
Our paper contributes to the growing literature of rm heterogeneity and
trade by focusing on the exporting behavior of foreign a¢ liates, which are
increasingly prevalent in todays globalized economy. To the best of our
knowledge, our study is the rst one reporting that exporters are less pro-
ductive than non-exporters. In addition, by incorporating into the standard
rm heterogeneity model (Melitz, 2003) the possibility that rms could set
up di¤erent stages of production in di¤erent countries (Grossman, Helpman,
17
and Szeidl, 2006), we are able to obtain much richer predictions on the rela-
tion between rm productivity and exporting behavior.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition
Comparing ((A;C;A)) with ((A;C;C)), we can derive the rst thresh-
old point:
1 =
fs
1  
C(dA;mC)
IA
T
  IC
 ; (A.1)
which is greater than 0 given that the size of market in the United States
is su¢ ciently larger than that in China (i.e., I
A
T
> IC). Thus, we have
((A;C;A))  ((A;C;C)) when   1, whereas ((A;C;A)) <
((A;C;C)) when  < 1.
Comparing ((A;C;A))with ((A;C;AC)), we can derive the second
threshold point:
2 =
fs
1  
1
IC
C(dA;mC) > 0; (A.2)
such that ((A;C;AC))  ((A;C;A)) when  2, whereas ((A;C;AC)) <
((A;C;A)) when  < 2.
Comparing ((A;C;AC))with ((A;AC;AC)), we can derive the third
threshold point:
3 =
fAm  fs
1  
T
IA
C(dA;mC)  C(dA;mA)
TC(dA;mC)  C(dA;mA) ; (A.3)
which is great then 0 given the tari¤-jumping assumption made in the model
setup (i.e., TC(dA;mC)   C(dA;mA) > 0 ) and the assumption fAm > fs.
So we have ((A;AC;AC))  ((A;C;AC)) when   3, whereas
((A;AC;AC))  ((A;C;AC)) when   3.
It can be shown that, when neither the American market nor the Chinese
market is negligible, i.e., I
A
IA+IC
 T (fs+fs)
(T+1)fs+Tfs
and
IC
IA+IC
 fs(TC(d
A;mC) C(dA;mA))
TC(dA;mA)(fAm f)+(TC(dA;mC) C(dA;mA))fs , we have
3  2  1 > 0. (A.4)
With inequality (A.4), it can be shown that8>><>>:
when 1 > , (A;C;C) is the optimal strategy
when 2 >   1, (A;C;A) is the optimal strategy
when 3 >   2, (A;C;AC) is the optimal strategy
when   3, (A;AC;AC) is the optimal strategy
: (A.5)
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Figure: The trade-off between fixed costs and production efficiency among four strategies   
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Table 1a: Representativeness of our dataset 
 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Number of firms in our dataset 144,161 140,903 142,549 152,345 162,769 178,467 156,017 243,332
Total export in our dataset (100 million USD) 1,265 1,351 1,712 1,917 2,374 3,200 3,959 5,816
China’s total export (100 million USD) 1,837 1,949 2,492 2,661 3,256 4,382 5,933 7,620
Percentage in China’s total export 69% 69% 69% 72% 73% 73% 67% 76% 
Note: Data on China’s total export come from China Statistical Yearbook (various years). 
 
Table 1b: Exporting behavior of domestic firms and foreign affiliates 
 
Year  
Percentage of 
exporters in all 
firms 
Percentage of 
exporters in 
foreign affiliates
Percentage of 
exporters in 
domestic firms
Percentage of 
output exported 
in all firms 
Percentage of 
output 
exported in 
foreign 
affiliates 
Percentage of 
output exported 
in domestic 
firms 
Percentage of 
total export 
exported by 
foreign affiliates
1998  24.32% 62.03% 16.84% 18.33% 39.23% 10.25% 59.66% 
1999  24.37% 61.13% 16.63% 18.14% 37.87% 9.96% 61.21% 
2000  25.83% 62.44% 17.64% 19.43% 39.14% 10.58% 62.42% 
2001  26.54% 62.89% 18.05% 19.35% 39.02% 10.21% 63.98% 
2002  27.62% 63.03% 19.17% 20.47% 41.46% 10.51% 65.20% 
2003  28.32% 63.90% 19.57% 21.32% 41.91% 10.84% 66.30% 
2004  29.83% 64.12% 20.98% 22.24% 44.35% 10.66% 68.52% 
2005  30.27% 64.06% 20.53% 23.41% 44.60% 10.83% 70.98% 
Average  27.14% 62.95% 18.68% 20.33% 40.95% 10.48% 64.78% 
 
 
Table 1c: Exporting behavior of domestic firms and foreign affiliates across geographic areas, 2005 
 
Area   
Share in China's total 
export 
Percentage  of 
exporters in foreign 
affiliates 
Percentage  of 
exporters in domestic 
firms 
Percentage  of output 
exported in foreign 
affiliates 
Percentage of output 
exported in domestic 
firms 
Share of total 
export exported by 
foreign affiliates
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Coastal  93.8% 66.0% 22.0% 47.1% 13.2% 71.4% 
Central  4.5% 41.6% 23.2% 13.7% 5.3% 27.6% 
Western   1.7% 30.2% 8.2% 9.3% 4.7% 17.1% 
Note: Numbers in column 1 represent accumulated shares in China’s total export for corresponding areas, while numbers in other columns represent simple 
averages of values for the corresponding areas. Coastal area includes Liaoning, Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hainan; Central area includes Heilongjiang, Jilin, Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, Henan, Anhui, Hubei, Hunan, and Jiangxi; and Western 
area includes Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Guizhou, Yunnan, Chongqing, Sichuan, and Tibet. 
 
 
 
Table 1d: Exporting behavior of domestic firms and foreign affiliates across industries, 2005 
 
Industry 
categorized by 
OECD R&D 
intensity standard   
Share in China's 
total export 
Percentage of 
exporters in foreign 
affiliates 
Percentage of 
exporters in 
domestic firms 
Percentage of output 
exported in foreign 
affiliates 
Percentage of output 
exported in domestic
firms 
Share of total export 
exported by foreign 
affiliates 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 
High  51.8% 65.0% 19.9% 55.3% 13.4% 82.8% 
Medium  16.2% 53.2% 15.7% 20.9% 7.1% 46.6% 
Low   32.0% 68.7% 25.4% 44.1% 13.0% 56.4% 
 
Table 1e: Exporting behavior of foreign affiliates 
 
Year   
Percentage of foreign affiliates selling all their 
output in China 
Percentage of foreign affiliates having sales in 
China and also exporting some of their output
Percentage of foreign affiliates exporting all 
their output 
1998  37.97% 36.27% 25.76% 
1999  38.87% 37.10% 24.04% 
2000  37.56% 37.75% 24.69% 
2001  37.11% 38.76% 24.14% 
2002  36.97% 39.52% 23.51% 
2003  36.10% 40.17% 23.73% 
2004  35.88% 43.04% 21.08% 
2005  35.94% 41.19% 22.87% 
Average   37.05% 39.22% 23.73% 
Table 2: Benchmark results 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sample Full sample Domestic firms Foreign affiliates Foreign affiliates Foreign affiliates Foreign affiliates Foreign affiliates 
Dependent variable TFP OLS TFP LP TFP OLSR TFP OLS3D TFP LP3D
Export 0.023*** 
(0.003) 
0.035*** 
(0.004) 
-0.013** 
(0.006) 
-0.030*** 
(0.008) 
-0.010** 
(0.005) 
-0.009* 
(0.005) 
-0.031*** 
(0.008) 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 222,784 161,560 61,224 46,712 46,712 61,156 39,328 
R-squared 0.2710 0.2655 0.2999 0.1397 0.3390 0.3386 0.1469 
p-value for F-test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: Robust-standard errors, clustered at the firm-level, are reported in the parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote the statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
Table 2: Benchmark results, cont. 
 
  8 9 10 11 12 
Sample Foreign affiliates 
Dependent variable TFP OLS TFP LP TFP OLSR TFP OLS3D TFP LP3D
Domestic sales only 0.004 
(0.007) 
0.027*** 
(0.008) 
0.002 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
0.028*** 
(0.006) 
Export only -0.043*** 
(0.007) 
-0.019** 
(0.008) 
-0.042*** 
(0.008) 
-0.037*** 
(0.007) 
-0.013** 
(0.006) 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 61,224 46,712 46,712 61,156 39,328 
R-squared 0.3009 0.1400 0.3399 0.3392 0.1471 
p-value for F-test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: Robust-standard errors, clustered at the firm-level, are reported in the parenthesis. ** and *** denote the statistical significance at the 5% 
and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Table 3: Estimation results using the full sample of firms in 2005 
 
  1 2 
Sample Foreign affiliates 
Dependent variable TFP OLS 
Export -0.0003 
(0.003)  
Domestic sales only 
 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
Export only 
 
-0.024*** 
(0.003) 
Industry dummy Yes Yes 
Region dummy Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes 
Number of observations 49,836 49,836 
R-squared 0.5215 0.5219 
p-value for F-test 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: Robust-standard errors, clustered at the firm-level, are reported in the 
parenthesis. ** and *** denote the statistical significance at the 5% and 1% 
level, respectively.  
Table 4: Robustness checks  
 
  1 2 3 4 
Specification 
Alternative 
definition of 
foreign affiliates
Exclusion of 
outlying 
observations 
Inclusion of firm 
size 
Estimating TFP 
only using 
foreign affiliates
Dependent variable TFP LP 
Domestic sales only 0.032*** 
(0.007) 
0.024*** 
(0.006) 
0.016** 
(0.008) 
0.029*** 
(0.008) 
Export only -0.028*** 
(0.007) 
-0.021*** 
(0.006) 
-0.026*** 
(0.008) 
-0.019** 
(0.008) 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 57,936 45,777 46,712 46,712 
R-squared 0.1314 0.1769 0.1428 0.1396 
p-value for F-test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: Robust-standard errors, clustered at the firm-level, are reported in the parenthesis. ** and 
*** denote the statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
